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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
Predicting The Single-Family 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage Default Rate of Principal 
Residents 
 
 
by 
 
Yang Liu 
 
Master of Business Administration, Graduate Program in Management 
University of California, Riverside, September 2019 
Prof. Jean Helwege, Chairperson 
 
Since 1960, researchers have used proxies, such as debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value 
ratio, combined-loan-to-value ratio, and the credit score of borrowers to measure mortgage 
loan performance. These variables provide a static view of mortgage defaults. However, 
mortgage defaults must be examined in a dynamic framework. Therefore, I used 
macroeconomic variables, such as real gross domestic product, the consumer price index, 
real median household income, interest rates, and the national home price index combined 
with the static variables to measure the relationships of all these variables with the default 
rate. I find that debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, national home price index, and 
unemployment rate positively associated with the default rate, while the real gross domestic 
product and the real median household income negatively associated with default rate. I 
also find that the real median household income is the most critical macroeconomic factor 
in predicting the default rate. 
Key Words: Single-Family, 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages, Default Rate, Logistic 
Regression Model. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Mortgage loans allow people to own real estate as a home, a shelter, or an investing tool. 
After receiving a loan, borrowers are required to pay scheduled payments to keep the 
property and avoid defaulting. However, defaults do occur. If a mortgage loan servicer fails 
to receive the regular payment on a loan, the borrower is delinquent. Delinquent loans can 
be categorized as less than 30 days, 30 to 59 days, 60 to 89 days, 90 to 119 days, and more 
than 119 days past the scheduled payment date. A default is usually considered to occur at 
the same time as delinquency. 
Defaults have consequences. Defaults decrease the credit ratings of borrowers and cause 
banks to distrust them. It also makes it more difficult for borrowers to receive another 
mortgage loan. Defaults also have social impacts. Defaults reduce local property values, 
discourage investment, and increase lending risk in communities. 
There are two main reasons defaults occur. First, borrowers are sometimes unable to pay 
the scheduled payments. In this situation, they are aware that they are facing default, but 
they are also facing financial hardships and struggling to fulfill their commitments. 
Divorce, sickness, inability to work, loss of a job, failure in business, and relocation are the 
primary trigger events for defaulting. These events decrease income and make it difficult 
for borrowers to pay scheduled payments. From 2007 to 2009, the United States 
experienced a housing bubble burst and mortgage crisis during which many people 
defaulted on their mortgages because they had no money to pay for their loans.  
The second reason that defaults occur is that people are sometimes unwilling to pay their 
loans. A mortgage loan is a combination of a call option and a put option. A mortgage 
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default is a put option. From a strictly financial perspective, it is reasonable to default when 
the put option is in the money. The put option is in the money when the house value is less 
than the mortgage value (when the borrower is in a position of significantly negative 
equity). Therefore, borrowers are more likely to default when house values fall even if their 
incomes have not. A defaulting borrower would benefit from living in the house rent-free 
until the eventual foreclosure. 
Researchers have studied mortgage loan performance since the 1960s. One of the primary 
areas of consideration is the relationship between trigger events and mortgage defaulting. 
However, it is difficult to obtain household-level information, and the evidence of what 
causes a default is limited. Consequently, scholars have used proxy measures to link 
household-level data with loan-level mortgage performance data. For the first factor 
affecting defaults (inability to pay), income is a fundamental reason for borrowers to 
default or not default. Hence, scholars use the debt-to-income ratio at the time of the 
mortgage origination as a proxy for post-origination income. Actual household 
unemployment experiences are challenging to obtain, so the local unemployment rate is 
used as a proxy to explain mortgage defaults. For the second reason for defaulting 
(unwillingness to pay), it is also difficult to obtain information on negative equity, but 
researchers can obtain loan-to-value (LTV) information at the mortgage origination date. 
If the LTV ratio is greater than 1, it is more likely for a rational borrower to default later 
when house prices decline.  
The debt-to-income ratio and LTV ratio are recorded when the mortgage originates and 
included in typical research datasets, so they provide a static view of mortgage defaulting. 
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However, this static view is only partially accurate because mortgage loans are paid off 
continuously via monthly payments. Therefore, mortgage loan performance must be 
examined in a dynamic and forward-looking framework. Macroeconomic variables, such 
as real gross domestic product (GDP), real median household income, consumer price 
index (CPI), and the national home price index (HPI), provide a dynamic complement to 
static variables. 
For a borrower who is unable to pay the scheduled payments and is facing the prospect of 
defaulting, one way to avoid foreclosure is to sell the property and use the proceeds to 
repay the loan. Real GDP reflects the economic situation of a country. When real GDP is 
growing, it is usually easier for borrowers to sell a house and avoid defaulting, whereas 
when real GDP is declining, it is more difficult for borrowers to sell a house and more 
likely for them to default. Furthermore, defaulting behavior is influenced by an individual’s 
surroundings, such as friends and family members. A borrower who is in a depressed 
financial situation may not intend to default but is influenced by friends or family members 
who are in a better financial situation. The house can be sold to them and the borrower can 
get the proceeds and repay the loan and avoid defaulting. Hence, real GDP influences 
borrowers’ default behavior. If a family has a higher real median household income, the 
family has more money to spend, which increases their ability to pay and decreases the 
probability of defaulting.  Higher interest rate means higher monthly payment, and 
borrowers are more likely to default if their income cannot support the high monthly 
payment.  
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Consumer price index measures inflation. An increase in CPI means that all house prices 
increase along with other expenses in the economy. It also reduces the real cost of loans. 
These effects increase the equity in the house, so it is more likely that a put option will be 
in the money and less likely that a borrower will default. The national home price index 
(HPI) calculates single-family house prices using weighted, repeat-sales transactions. It 
reflects the trend in house price changes in a dynamic way. Hence, the HPI provides a far-
sighted view of mortgage loan default. 
In addition to potentially adding greater explanatory power in a regression setting, 
macroeconomic variables have the advantage that they are easier to forecast than household 
variables. If a researcher desires to predict the likelihood of default, it is more likely that 
predictions of macroeconomic factors will be available and individual homeowner 
variables will not, given that LTV and debt-to-income are rarely available after the date of 
mortgage origination. 
In sum, I predicted that a combination of macroeconomic variables and those static 
variables would provide a dynamic view of the mortgage default decision and supplement 
existing research work. Based on the reasons for choosing a combination of variables, I 
have studied the mortgage default rate using a combination of macroeconomic variables 
and traditional variables, such as debt-to-income ratio, LTV, CLTV, original interest rate, 
and the borrower’s credit score.  
The dataset used is from Fannie Mae. Using this dataset, I built a logistic regression model. 
The original data were too numerous to process. Therefore, I focused on 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgages of single-family homes that were bought as principal residences. The study 
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period was from January 1, 2000, to January 1, 2012. The dependent variable was the 
annual default rate, which was used to estimate the likelihood of default. The explanatory 
variables were composed of three parts. The first part was information on the mortgage 
loan at the origination date, such as the debt-to-income ratio, the LTV ratio, the borrower’s 
credit score, and the original interest rate. The second part consisted of macroeconomic 
variables, such as the real GDP, the CPI, the unemployment rate, the real median household 
income, and HPI. The third part consisted of interest rates, which include the effective 
federal funds rate, the 10-year Treasury rate, and the current 30-year fixed-rate mortgage 
(which was compared to the borrower’s original interest rate).  
This paper discusses the building of five models that examine the role played by these 
macroeconomic variables. From the results of these models, I found that the debt-to-
income ratio, LTV ratio, and credit scores are reliable proxies for predicting the probability 
of defaulting. Among the macroeconomic variables, the real GDP is more critical than the 
CPI because the real GDP is significantly negatively related to the mortgage default rate. 
Although many researchers believe unemployment is a trigger event to defaulting, this 
research found that real median household income is more important than the 
unemployment rate. People do not tend to default when they have high real median 
household income even when they are unemployed. However, if they have a low real 
median household income and are unemployed, they are more susceptible to defaulting. 
The paper also found that the HPI has a positive relationship with defaulting.  
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By comparing the three kinds of interest rates, I found that the effective federal funds rate 
is the most crucial interest rate to consider as a proxy. It influences the other two interest 
rates, and it substantially contributes to mortgage performance. 
In sum, I have found that the real GDP, real median household income, HPI, and effective 
federal funds rate are reliable macroeconomic proxies for measuring the mortgage default 
rate. Real GDP works well as a proxy in a period when good economic situation falls back 
into a recession. Real median household income measures income level and has a 
significant correlation with interest rate. I believe it is the most critical macroeconomic 
proxy for studying the mortgage default rate.  
This article is divided into five chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the objective of the topic; 
Chapter 2 is the literature review; Chapter 3 discusses methodology and data; Chapter 4 
discusses the results; Chapter 5 presents the conclusion and discussion. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
From 1969 until the present, many scholars have discussed loan performance behavior: 
defaulting, prepaying, and refinancing. Their research can be divided into four areas.  
2.1 Loan Performance Under Financial Option Theory 
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) analyzed the effects of a call option on an underlying asset 
and inspired the interest of many researchers. They found that the put–call option theory is 
an effective way to explain default or prepayment. Hence, the theory has become the 
primary way of discussing loan performance and borrowers’ defaulting behavior. The 
theory states that when a call option is “in the money,” borrowers tend to prepay, while 
when a put option is “in the money,” borrowers tend to default. Schwartz and Torous (1989) 
used the option theory to build a valuation framework to examine the prepayment 
experience and value the mortgage-backed securities. Stanton (1995) believed that the 
value of the call option statistically relates to mortgage termination with refinancing. 
Yongheng, Della, and Changfeng (2005) assessed residential mortgage performance in 
China and found that the option theory failed in China, while other non-option methods 
related to financial-economic factors play significant roles in determining default risks in 
China. They also found that prepayment behavior strongly related to borrowers’ 
characteristics, so mortgage-lending programs can improve market efficiency and enhance 
household creditability. Ahlawat (2018) used Monte-Carlo simulation to evaluate the joint 
put–call option embedded in a mortgage contract. He identified the critical difference 
between ruthless and non-ruthless mortgage defaults and found that non-ruthless mortgage 
defaulters are more likely to redefault after 90 days.  
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2.2 The Factors of Mortgage Defaulting 
Green and Shoven (1986) discussed the relationship between the interest rate and mortgage 
performance. Yongheng (1997) adopted a proportional hazard framework to analyze 
mortgage risk, and the result showed that prepayment and default behavior could be 
predicted through a stochastic term structure. Calhoun and Yongheng (2002) confirmed 
the option theory and found that conditional prepayment probability, original LTV ratio, 
relative loan size, and other economic and demographic factors should be considered in 
empirical models. Hong (2010) found that people experience substantial financial loss in a 
credit crisis, and thus the subprime losses cannot be explained by the traditional mortgage 
model, and HPI and house price appreciation should be considered. Voicu, Jacob, Renger, 
and Irene (2012) first examined default factors associated with pre-foreclosure outcomes 
for subprime mortgages and then examined factors related to different results for loans that 
enter foreclosure. Schmeiser and Gross (2015) discussed the determinants of subprime 
mortgage performance. They found that a high LTV ratio significantly contributes to 
redefault and foreclosure, and any modification intended to increase loan principal is most 
likely to fail and even controls the profit and loss changes. Chao Yue, Quercia, and Riley 
(2015) believed unemployment is a trigger event for mortgage defaulting.  
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2.3 Empirical Mortgage Models 
Magee (1968) studied multifamily neighborhood default rates using Cambridge data. She 
captured both lifecycle and property financial variables and built the first formal 
commercial loan default model. From 1969, Furstenberg (1969, 1970a, 1970b) studied the 
annual default rate of single-family loans. His work is regarded as the beginning of modern 
statistical mortgage modeling. Cambell and Dietrich (1983) combined default and 
prepayment rates into one empirical model. Berkovec, Canner, Stuart, Gabriel, and Hannan 
(1994) used an empirical model to reject the theory that default rates are relatively lower 
among minority borrowers and in minority neighborhoods. Kelly and JR (2001) used the 
pure options-pricing model to analyze prepayment behavior of borrowers and found that 
the value of delaying prepayment was higher for mortgages with declining rate penalties 
than mortgages with static-rate penalties and that higher interest rate spread can trigger 
refinancing. Anthony (2003) examined 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, compared nonprime 
and prime loan defaults, and found that many differences exist between nonprime and 
prime loans. Ali (2017) used the K Nearest Neighbor (KNN) model, logistic regression 
model, tree-based model, and support vector machines (SVM) to predict mortgage loan 
default and found that the LTV ratio is the most significant factor in predicting loan 
performance. Shuyao (2017) built a transition model based on the Markov chain model to 
estimate default transition probabilities. 
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2.4 Methods of Solving Defaults 
Mills and Lubuele (1994) studied the residential mortgage performance in low-and 
moderate-income neighborhoods and found that lending programs are perfect for building 
these communities. Hartarska and Gonzalez (2005) studied the effects of the implemented 
counseling programs in the Midwest of the United States and found that counseling 
programs affect the behavior of lenders and borrowers and that the net effect should be 
evaluated under both prepayment and default. 
Although scholars use diverse methods to discuss the factors of default, they focus on the 
loan-to-value ratio, combined loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio and borrowers' 
information, such as credit score. They seldom talk about default rate with other 
macroeconomic data but their research implies the importance of macroeconomic 
variables, so the paper studies this area and extends the existing research. 
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Chapter 3:  Methodology and Data 
3.1Empirical Model   
  
This paper’s main objective is to discover the relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and mortgage default rate, so models with different variables must be compared. 
The logistic regression model is the basic model used in the paper. By using different 
variables in the model, we can determine how macroeconomic variables explain the default 
rate. 
Logistic Regression Model 
The logistic regression model uses a logistic function to model a binary dependent variable. 
A logistic regression model must have a dependent variable with two possible outcomes, 
such as pass/fail, win/loss, or healthy/sick. 
The basic logistic model is: 
Log(y)=log[y/(1-y)] =β0 + β1X1+ β2X2+………………βnXn 
The corresponding odds: 
O=b β0 + β1X1+ β2X2+………………βnXn          (b is the base of the logarithm)  
The probability: 
P= b β0 + β1X1+ β2X2+………………βnXn/ (b β0 + β1X1+ β2X2+………………βnXn+1) 
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In this paper:  
Traditional model: 
Log (default rate) = β0 + β1 LTV+β2 CLTV+β3 Borrower’s Credit Score+ β4 Original 
Interest Rate +β5 Debt-to-income-ratio 
The Model with Macroeconomic Variables: 
Log (default rate) = β0 + β1 Real GDP+β2 CPI+β3 Real Median Household Income+β4 
HPI+β5 Unemployment Rate +β6 LTV +β7 Debt-to-income-ratio+β8  Effective Federal 
Funds Rate +β9Borrower’s Credit Score 
The Model with Macroeconomic Variables and 10-year Treasury Rate: 
Log (default rate) = β0 + β1Real GDP+β2CPI+β3Real Median Household 
Income+β4HPI+β5 Unemployment Rate +β6 LTV +β7 Debt-to-income-ratio+β8 10-Year 
Treasury Rate+β9Borrower’s Credit Score 
The Model with Macroeconomic Variables and 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage 
Minus the Original Interest Rate: 
Log (default rate) = β0 + β1Real GDP+β2CPI+β3Real Median Household 
Income+β4HPI+β5 Unemployment Rate +β6 LTV +β7 Debt-to-income-ratio+β8 30-Year 
Fixed-Rate Mortgage minus the original interest rate +β9Borrower’s Credit Score 
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3.2 Data Source 
The original data are from Fannie Mae from January 1, 2000, to January 1, 2012. These 
data are divided into two parts. One is acquisition data. Fannie Mae records the original 
data of loans, such as LTV ratio, CLTV ratio, debt-to-income ratio, original interest rate, 
and borrowers’ credit score. 
The other portion of the data is performance data. Fannie Mae dynamically records the 
monthly data of loans, such as the monthly reporting period, current delinquency status of 
the loan, and the location of the borrower. 
A stock index loan ID is linked to combine the two datasets.   
Because the performance dataset documents cross-panel data, the number of original data 
is very large. There are more than 600 million monthly observations and more than 28.8 
million mortgage loans. Due to the extensive dataset, I decided to focus on data that meet 
the following five conditions: 
First, a mortgage must not have a delinquency status (current delinquency status=0).The 
number of these data is very large, and they were omitted from this paper. 
Second, the data must focus on the single-family property type. Other types, such as condo, 
manufactured housing, or co-op housing were not included in the paper. 
Third, the data must concentrate on fixed-rate mortgages, so adjusted-rate mortgages were 
excluded from the paper. 
Fourth, the data must be limited to 30-year loan terms and must not be 10-year, 15-year, 
25-year, or other terms of mortgage. 
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Finally, the data must focus on mortgage loans of principal residence at origination date, 
so mortgage loans of secondary homes and investments were omitted. 
 
From these five conditions, there were 85,258,409 monthly observations, but missing 
values remained. After removing missing values, 36,417,887 observations and 13,498,409 
mortgages were used in the paper, and the SAS 9.4 version was used to calculate the sample 
data. 
 
Table 1 The Number of Single-Family 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages that bought by the 
Principal Residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Origination Year The Number of Mortgages  
2000 787,349 
2001 1,645,317 
2002 1,664,112 
2003 2,453,407 
2004 878,153 
2005 779,861 
2006 594,304 
2007 679,807 
2008 720,207 
2009 1,128,360 
2010 673,137 
2011 573,624 
2012 920,771 
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3.3 Description of Acquisition Data.  
 
From the acquisition data set, we can see the static data at the first time of the mortgage 
loan. I extracted eight variables from the data set. 
 
Table 2 Description of Acquisition Dataset 
Data Element Description Data Type Values 
Calculation 
Loan id  An index to identify specific loan Numeric N/A 
Original Interest Rate The interest rate when first create 
the mortgage 
Numeric N/A 
Original Loan Term Borrow payments scheduled term Numeric 360 
Origination Date The date when the mortgage was 
documented  
Date MM/YYYY 
Original Loan-To-
Value (LTV) 
The loan-to-value ratio at the 
origination date 
Numeric 0%-97% 
Original combined 
Loan-To-Value 
(CLTV) 
The ratio of all secured loans on a 
property to the value of a property 
Numeric 0%-200% 
Original Debt-to-
income-ratio 
Borrowers’ total monthly 
obligations (including housing 
expense) by monthly income 
Numeric 1%-64% 
Borrower Credit Score 
at Origination 
Borrower Credit Score at 
Origination 
Numeric 300-850 
 
 
3.4 Description of Performance Data set 
 
The performance dataset shows the monthly dynamic data of each mortgage loan until the 
mortgage loan goes to default or is prepaid. I extracted three variables from the dataset. 
The three variables are loan ID, monthly reporting period, and current loan delinquency 
status. Current loan delinquency status measures the number of months the obligor was 
delinquent for. The value 0 means current or less than 30 days past due, 1 means 30–59 
days past due, 2 means 60–89 days past due, 3 means 90–119 days past due, and the 
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sequence continues as such for every 30 days. For the sample dataset, 80% of mortgages 
have no default behavior and 20% mortgages have default behavior. Fannie Mae uses X to 
represent unknown current loan delinquency status. Because the number of unknown data 
equals the average of known data, I placed 0 next to those mortgages with unknown current 
loan delinquency status. 
 
Table 3 Description of Performance Dataset 
Data Element Description Data Type Values 
Calculation 
Loan id  An index to identify specific 
loan 
Numeric N/A 
Monthly reporting 
Period 
The cut-off period for 
mortgage loan information 
Date MM/DD/YYYY 
Current Loan 
Delinquency Status  
The number of months the 
obligor is delinquent as 
determined by the governing 
mortgage documents 
Alpha-numeric ▪0=current, or less 
than 30 days past 
due 
▪1= 30-59 days 
▪2=60-89 
▪3=90-119 
Sequence 
continues 
thereafter for 
every 30 days 
period 
▪X=unknown 
 
 
3.5 Description of Macroeconomic Variables 
All macroeconomic variables are from Federal Reserve Economic Data. Real GDP, CPI, 
unemployment rate, real median household income, national HPI, effective federal funds 
rate, 10-year Treasury rate, and 30-year fixed-rate mortgage were used in this research. All 
variables are of annual frequency. The period was from January 1, 2000, to January 1, 
2012. 
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3.5.1 Real Gross Domestic Product 
 
Real GDP measures the value of all goods and services of a given economic entity in a 
specific year. It adjusts for inflation, so it more accurately reflects the financial situation 
of a country. High real GDP reflects the faster development of a nation. 
3.5.2 Unemployment Rate 
 
The unemployment rate measures the unemployed labor force in the job market. When 
the market is strong, the rate is low; when the market is weak, the rate is high. From the 
work of previous researchers, unemployment is a trigger event to mortgage defaulting. 
3.5.3 Real Median Household Income 
 
Real median household income divides household income into two parts: One part is higher 
than the median level, and the other is less than the median level. The higher the real 
median household income, the better the household economic situation, and the household 
can spend more money on loans, autos, and other family expenditures. 
3.5.4 Consumer Price Index 
 
The CPI measures the weighted price change of a market. Usually, it uses a specific year 
as a base and then records the price change of other years for comparison to the base 
year. The CPI is also an indicator of inflation: Under the same income level, if inflation 
increases, goods and services cost more. Regarding equity position, higher CPI results in 
a higher equity position. 
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3.5.5 The National Home Price Index 
The national HPI measures the movement of single-family house prices and records house 
price trends at geographic levels. The HPI has been proven by researchers to be a valid 
measurement of the mortgage default rate.  
3.5.6 Effective Federal Funds Rate 
The Federal Reserve has bank accounts and sets reserve requirements for them. Banks 
with larger end-of-day balance are usually required to lend funds to other banks and 
charge an interest rate, which is known as the effective federal funds rate. The effective 
federal funds rate is one of the most influential interest rates in the U.S. economy because 
it affects the economic situation, such as employment, growth, and inflation. The rate 
also influences the mortgage interest rate. 
3.5.7 10-Year Treasury Rate 
The 10-year Treasury rate is used by the Federal Reserve to determine the index of 10-year 
Treasury securities. This rate is affected by the federal funds rate and usually determines 
the mortgage rate by affecting mortgage securities. The 1-year Treasury maturity rate is 
widely used to determine adjustable-rate mortgages. The 10-year Treasury rate influences 
30-year fixed-rate mortgages.  
3.5.8 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage  
A fixed-rate mortgage is a loan with a fixed interest rate and 30-year fixed-rate mortgages 
mean the interest rate remains the same for 30 years. The 10-year Treasury rate 
influences 30-year fixed-rate mortgages.  
19 
 
 
3.6 Explanatory Variables 
 
For a logistic regression model, the dependent variable must be binary, so I introduced a 
new variable, delinquent, to represent the current delinquent status. If the current 
delinquent status equals 0 or unknown, then delinquent = 0; otherwise delinquent = 1. The 
number 0 means there is no default. The number 1 means there is a default. The Fannie 
Mae performance data record monthly delinquent status, but the objective of this paper is 
to estimate the annual default rate, thus, I changed the monthly delinquent data to annual 
delinquent data. Because Fannie Mae records the current delinquency status before loan 
default or prepayment, the time used in the model is not fixed. If a mortgage defaulted in 
the same year as the origination year, then the default data are only for 1 year. However, if 
a mortgage defaulted in 2012, then the period of the loan is 13 years. 
Table 4 and 5 show the delinquency binary result from those annual observations.  
Table 4 Delinquency Binary Result 
Delinquent Frequency Percent Cumulative frequency Cumulative percent 
0 28712813 78.84 28712813 78.84 
1 7705074 21.16 36417887 100.00 
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From 2001 to 2003, the default percent was remained around 15% but increased to nearly 
23% from 2007 to the 2012 year. 
Table 5 Default Frequency by Year 
Year  Default Frequency Percent 
2000 5749 19.48 
2001 114,602 15.74 
2002 305,833 15.93 
2003 386,023 15.09 
2004 583,018 20.3 
2005 593,273 19.69 
2006 660,769 20.96 
2007 715,498 21.42 
2008 832,298 22.89 
2009 900,157 22.95 
2010 927,779 22.91 
2011 873,440 22.85 
2012 806,635 23.91 
 
 
3.7 Independent variables: 
 
3.7.1 Individual’s Measurement 
 
3.7.1.1 Loan-to-Value Ratio 
Loan-to-value measures the ratio of the loan to the value of the purchased asset. The 
higher the ratio, the higher the probability of defaulting. The mean LTV in the sample 
data is 72.07%. 
3.7.1.2 Combined-Loan-to-Value Ratio 
The CLTV reflects all loan values to a mortgage value. The mean of the CLTV in the 
sample is 73.04%. 
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3.7.1.3 Debt-to-Income Ratio 
Debt-to-income ratio is debt payment divided by gross income and shows the relationship 
between debt and income. If the ratio approaches 1, it means the debt proportion is higher 
in the overall income. The mean of the debt-to-income ratio in the sample is 34.66%.  
3.7.1.4 Borrowers’ Credit Score 
Borrowers' credit score evaluates the credit rating of borrowers. High credit score usually 
reflects trustworthiness of borrowers. In the paper, the borrowers’ credit score refers to the 
Fair, Isaac and Company (FICO) score. The mean score in the sample is 723.35. 
3.7.1.5 Original Interest Rate 
The original interest rate is the interest rate of a mortgage at the origination date. The mean 
of the original interest rate in the sample is 6.09%. 
3.7.2 Macroeconomic Variables 
 
3.7.2.1 Real GDP 
The annual percentage change of the real GDP was taken from 2000 to 2012. The mean 
of the 13 years is 1.96%. The maximum was 4.13% in 2000, and the minimum was  
-2.54% in 2009. 
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Figure 1 Percent Change of Real GDP 
 
 
 
3.7.2.2 Consumer Price Index: Total of All Items for the United States 
The annual percentage change of the CPI was also taken from 2000 to 2012. The mean of 
the 13 years is 2.50%. The maximum was 3.81% in 2008, and the minimum was -0.32% 
in 2009. After comparing the percentage change of CPI and real GDP in the given sample 
period, we found that both had dropped to their lowest values in 2009, which confirmed 
the downward trend of the Great Recession. 
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Figure 2 Percent Change of CPI 
 
 
3.7.2.3 Unemployment Rate: All Persons Aged 15–64 in the United States 
Unemployment usually coincides with the business cycle. High economic growth means a 
healthy labor market and low unemployment rate. Slow economic growth causes a high 
unemployment rate. From 2008, the unemployment rate increased steadily and peaked in 
2010. 
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Figure 3 Unemployment Rate from 2000 to 2012  
 
 
3.7.2.4 Real Median Household Income   
The mean of the real median household income from 2000 to 2012 is $57,522.92. From 
2000 to 2006, the real median household income was approximately $58,000 but dropped 
to $54,673 in 2011 and $54,569 in 2012. 
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Figure 4 Real Median Household Income from 2000 to 2012  
 
3.7.2.5 National Home Price Index 
The S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index has index value 100 for January 
2000. From 2000 to 2006, the HPI continued an increasing trend. The maximum HPI was 
in 2006 with 183.45.   
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Figure 5 The national home price index from 2000 to 2012  
 
3.7.2.6 Effective Federal Funds Rate 
In the year 2000, the effective federal funds rate was high at 6.24% but dropped to 1.13% 
in 2005 and increased to 5.02% in 2007. Unfortunately, the financial crisis occurred, and 
the Federal Reserve decreased the rate to 0.16% in 2009 and kept it low until 2012. The 
low interest rate simulated capital investment and consumption. From 2007 to 2012, 
inflation was also high. The combination of high inflation with a low-interest-rate 
environment encouraged consumers to spend money. In this way, the Federal Reserve 
hoped to stimulate economic recovery. 
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Figure 6 Effective Federal Funds Rate from 2000 to 2012  
 
3.7.2.7 10-Year Treasury Rate 
From the comparison of the effective federal funds rate and 10-year Treasury rate, I found 
that the two rates are positively related. They both decreased between 2000 and 2004, and 
increased from 2005 to 2007, and then decreased from 2008 to 2012. The effective federal 
funds rate moved more sharply than the 10-year Treasury rate. 
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Figure 7 Effective Federal Funds Rate V.S.10-Year Treasury Rate from 2000 to 2012  
 
 
3.7.2.8 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage  
The Figure 8 below shows that the 10-year Treasury rate and 30-year fixed-rate mortgage 
rate have the same trend, and the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rate is higher than the 10-
year Treasury rate because the 10-year Treasury is a risk-free asset, while the 30-year fixed-
rate mortgage is a risky asset and there is a risk premium. 
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Figure 8 10-Year Treasury Rate V.S. 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage 
 
 
3.8 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
 
From descriptive statistics of independent variables, I believe that the LTV ratio and CLTV 
ratio may contribute equally to the logistic model. Furthermore, real GDP and CPI may 
contribute similarly to the model. In addition, the real GDP, CPI, HPI, and unemployment 
rate sharply changed during the sample period. I believe that they are good proxies for use 
in the logistic regression model to predict the probability of defaulting.   
. 
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Table 6 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
 Mean Standard Error Minimum  Maximum 
Debt-to-income ratio 34.66 12.42 1.00 64.00 
Loan-to-value ratio 72.07 16.26 1.00 97.00 
Combined-Loan-to 
value ratio 
73.04 16.50 1.00 192.00 
Borrowers’ score 723.35 57.76 300.00 850.00 
Original interest rate 6.09 0.81 1.88 13.50 
Real GDP 1.96 0.50 -2.54 4.13 
CPI 2.50 0.30 -0.32 3.81 
HPI 145.93 6.76 104.77 183.45 
Unemployment rate 6.40 0.55 4.02 9.77 
Real Median 
Household Income 
57522 471 54569 59938 
Effective Funds Rate 2.31 0.59 0.10 6.24 
10-Year Treasury Rate 4.03 0.30 1.80 6.03 
30-Year Fixed-Rate 
Mortgage 
5.82 0.32 3.66 8.05 
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Chapter 4 Discussion of result 
4.1 Model Comparison 
 
4.1.1 Traditional model  
 
From previous literature, I found that LTV, CLTV, borrowers’ credit score, and debt-to-
income ratio have been used as proxies to measure mortgage performance. This model 
keeps the four variables and adds original interest rate to estimate the default rate. 
 
From the traditional model, the likelihood ratio chi-square value of 4,997,748.46 with a p-
value of 0.0001 shows that the entire model is significantly better than an empty model. 
Score and Wald tests were used to test the same hypothesis, and they both show that the 
model is statistically significant. 
 
Table 7  Validation Test of The Traditional Model 
Test Chi-Square Value P-value 
Likelihood 4997748.46 0.0001 
Score 4909347.50 0.0001 
Wald 4124182.03 0.0001 
 
By using the logistic model, the paper estimates the situation of delinquent =1, which 
means there exists default behavior. From the result, we can get the model as follows: 
Log (default rate) = 7.43+ 0.0188 Debt-to-income ratio +0.00675 LTV+ 0.00323 CLTV 
+0.0605 original interest rate -0.0148 borrowers’ credit score. 
From the result, I found that all parameters are significant at p-value=0.0001. 
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For every unit increase in debt-to-income ratio, the log odds of defaulting increase by 
0.0188; for every unit increase in LTV, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.00675; for 
every unit increase in borrowers’ credit score, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0148; for every unit increase in original interest rate, the log odds of defaulting increase 
by 0.0605. 
In the traditional model, debt-to-income ratio, LTV, CLTV, and original interest rate have 
a positive relationship with the default rate. The borrowers’ credit score negatively 
associated with mortgage default rate. The higher the borrowers’ credit score, the lower the 
default rate. This result coincides with expectations and outcomes of previous researchers. 
The original interest rate contributed most to this model, which shows the original interest 
rate is most important factor to predict default rate.  However, this model has a static 
viewpoint, so I added macroeconomic variables to see how they contribute to the mortgage 
default rate. 
Table 8 Parameter of The Traditional Model 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 7.4349*** 0.00772 
Debt-to-income-ratio 0.0188*** 0.000036 
LTV 0.00675*** 0.000114 
CLTV 0.00323*** 0.000112 
Original Interest Rate 0.0605*** 0.000585 
Borrower’s credit score -0.0148*** 8.186E-6 
Note: ***represent significant levels of 1% 
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4.1.2 The Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
 
In the traditional model, the LTV and CLTV have the same relationship with default rate, 
but the CLTV has a smaller parameter, so I used LTV instead of CLTV in the next models. 
In the first model with macroeconomic variables, I used debt-to-income ratio, LTV, 
borrower’s credit score, real GDP, CPI, unemployment rate, HPI, real median household 
income, and effective federal funds rate. 
 
Table 9 Validation Test of The First Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Test Chi-Square Value P-value 
Likelihood 5345829.14 0.0001 
Score 5231273.59 0.0001 
Wald 4353678.36 0.0001 
 
For the first model with macroeconomic variables, the paper also estimates the situation of 
delinquent = 1, which means there exist defaults. The model is significant, and the 
parameter is calculated as follows: 
Log (default rate) = 17.86 + 0.0175 Debt-to-income-ratio + 0.0121 LTV - 0.0155 
borrowers’ credit score - 0.0332 Real GDP - 0.0268 CPI + 0.0155 Unemployment Rate + 
0.0114 HPI - 0.00020 Real Median Household Income + 0.0480 Effective Federal Funds 
Rate 
For every unit increase in debt-to-income ratio, the log odds of defaulting increase by 
0.0175; for every unit increase in LTV, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.0121; for 
every unit increase in borrowers’ credit score, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0155; for every percentage increase in real GDP, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
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0.0332; for every percentage increase in CPI, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 0.0268; 
for a unit increase in the unemployment rate, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.0155; 
for a unit increase in HPI, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.0114; for a unit increase 
in real median household income, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 0.00020; for a 
unit increase in effective federal funds rate, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.0480. 
 
Comparing the first model that includes macroeconomic variables with the traditional 
model, I found that debt-to-income ratio, LTV, and borrowers’ credit score are in 
accordance with the traditional model, which means the three variables are significant 
indicators in estimating default rate under a macroenvironment. 
The real GDP, CPI, and real median household income have a negative relationship with 
the mortgage default rate. When the economy is growing, borrowers are inclined to 
refinance and avoid default. A high CPI shows that the inflation is also high, and as a result, 
the value of equity in the home increases and decreases the probability of becoming 
negative equity. As real median household income increases, borrowers have more money 
to spend and a higher likelihood of paying the monthly scheduled payment on time and 
avoiding default.   
The unemployment rate, HPI, and effective federal funds rate have a positive relationship 
with the mortgage default rate. The unemployment rate is composed of two main aspects: 
being laid off and being unable to work. In a good economic situation, the unemployment 
rate is low. When the economy experiences a recession, companies and other institutions 
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must lay off employees to continue operating. The laid-off workers lose income, and it 
becomes difficult for them to find new jobs due to economic recession. Under this situation, 
borrowers must default because they have no money to pay the mortgage. Inability to work 
is the other aspect of unemployment. When borrowers begin a mortgage loan, they may be 
sure that they can pay the loan payments on time. However, accidents happen. Borrowers 
lose the ability to work and must default due to a shortage in money. The HPI is a predictor 
of house prices. A higher house index causes borrowers to pay more to the loan and causes 
a higher probability of defaulting. A low interest rate means a cheaper cost to borrowers, 
which then increases demand. The high demand increases house prices, improves the 
household equity position, allows people to borrow more, and increases the debt amount. 
A low interest rate usually follows a high interest rate in a business cycle. The high interest 
rate boosts house prices, decreases demand, and lowers the equity position, resulting in 
positive equity becoming negative. The combination of low income or no income, high 
monthly payment, and a negative equity position causes a default. 
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Table 10 Parameter of The First Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 17.8629*** 0.0579 
Debt-to-income-ratio 0.0175*** 0.000037 
LTV 0.0121*** 0.000030 
Borrower’s credit score -0.0155*** 8.02E-6 
Real GDP -0.0332*** 0.000318 
CPI -0.0268*** 0.000772 
Unemployment Rate 0.0155*** 0.000807 
HPI 0.0114*** 0.000043 
Real Median Household Income -0.00020*** 9.224E-7 
Effective Federal Funds Rate 0.0480*** 0.000736 
Note: ***represent significant levels of 1% 
 
 
4.1.3 The Model with Macroeconomic Variables and 10-year Treasury Rate 
 
In the first model with macroeconomic variables, the real GDP and CPI have a negative 
relationship with the default rate and a similar estimated parameter, so I created a 
correlation table to see the relationship among these macroeconomic variables. 
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Table 11 Correlation of All Macroeconomic Variables 
 
 
 
The correlation table of all macroeconomic variables shows that real GDP and CPI have a 
significant positive relationship. Real median household income negatively associated with 
the unemployment rate. This means when real median household income is higher, the 
unemployment rate is lower, and vice versa. The effective federal funds rate significantly 
relates to CPI and real median household income. Because the 10-year Treasury rate and 
30-year fixed-rate mortgage are influenced by the effective federal funds rate, it also has a 
significant relationship with real median household income. 
 
  Real 
GDP 
CPI Unemployme
nt rate 
HPI Real 
Median 
Househ
old 
Income 
Effectiv
e Funds 
Rate 
10-Year 
Treasur
y Rate 
30-Year 
Fixed-
Rate 
Mortgag
e  
Real GDP 1.00               
CPI 0.55 1.00             
Unemploym
ent Rate 
-0.46 -0.62 1.00           
HPI -0.06 0.18 -0.04 1.00         
Real Median 
Household 
Income 
0.23 0.31 -0.88 0.04 1.00       
Effective 
Federal 
Funds Rate 
0.38 0.55 -0.86 0.07 0.87 1.00     
10-Year 
Treasury 
Rate 
0.35 0.36 -0.83 -0.19 0.93 0.85 1.00   
30-Year 
Fixed-Rate 
Mortgage 
0.26 0.39                 -0.84 -0.24 0.92 0.84 0.98 1.00 
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In the second macroeconomic variables model, I used a 10-year Treasury rate instead of 
the effective federal funds rate and omitted real median household income due to the high 
correlation, and I left other variables unchanged. 
The validation test shows that this model is also significant. 
 
Table 12 Validation Test of The Second Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Test Chi-Square Value P-value 
Likelihood 5332886.41 0.0001 
Score 5218790.49 0.0001 
Wald 4345873.56 0.0001 
 
The logistical model is estimated as follows: 
Log(default) = 6.39+ 0.0175 Debt-to-income-ratio +0.0121LTV -0.0154 borrowers’ 
credit score-0.00847 Real GDP +0.0512 CPI+ 0.0898 Unemployment Rate+ 0.0104 HPI 
-0.1644 10-Year Treasury Rate 
For every unit increase in debt-to-income-ratio, the log odds of defaulting increases by 
0.0175; for every unit increase in LTV, the log odds of defaulting increases by 0.0121; for 
every unit increase in borrowers’ credit score, the log odds of defaulting decreases by 
0.01554; for every percentage increase in real GDP, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.00847; For every percentage increase in CPI, the log odds of defaulting increase by 
0.0512; for a unit increase in the unemployment rate, the log odds of defaulting increase 
by 0.0898; for a unit increases in HPI, the log odds of defaulting increases by 0.0104; for 
a unit increase in 10-year Treasury rate, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 0.1644. 
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Table 13 Parameter of The Second Model with Macroeconomic Variables (no real median 
household income) 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 6.3922*** 0.0105 
Debt-to-income-ratio 0.0175*** 0.000037 
LTV 0.0121*** 0.000030 
Borrower’s credit score -0.0154*** 8.012E-6 
Real GDP -0.00847*** 0.000302 
CPI 0.0512*** 0.000587 
Unemployment Rate 0.0898*** 0.000488 
HPI 0.0104*** 0.000032 
10-Year Treasury Rate -0.1644*** 0.000872 
Note: ***represent significant levels of 1% 
 
In the second macroeconomics model, the debt-to-income ratio, LTV, unemployment rate, 
and HPI have the same trend as the first model and positively relate to the default rate. The 
newly added variable, the 10-year Treasury rate, has a negative relationship with the 
mortgage default rate. However, the result is somewhat strange because the 10-year 
Treasury rate is influenced by the effective federal funds rate, and the two variables should 
have the same trend with the default rate. Subsequently, I added the real median household 
income back into the model, and the logistic regression result is the following: 
Log (default rate) = 16.63 + 0.0176 Debt-to-income-ratio + 0.0121LTV - 0.0154 
borrowers’ credit score - 0.0295 Real GDP - 0.0219CPI + 0.004 Unemployment Rate + 
0.0131HPI - 0.00018 Real Median Household Income + 0.00504 10-Year Treasury rate 
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In the modified model, the real median household income has a negative relationship with 
the mortgage default rate, and the 10-year Treasury rate shows a positive relationship. The 
result shows that real median household income is a significant macroeconomic variable 
in predicting the default rate. The result also shows the estimated parameter of 
unemployment rate increases to 0.09 after deleting real median household income but 
decreases to 0.004 after returning the real median household income, which proves that the 
real median household income is more important than the unemployment rate in measuring 
household income ability and predicting the default rate. 
 
Table 14 Parameter of The Second Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 16.6300*** 0.1103 
Debt-to-income-ratio 0.0176*** 0.000037 
LTV 0.0121*** 0.000030 
Borrower’s credit score -0.0154*** 8.015E-6 
Real GDP -0.0295*** 0.000377 
CPI -0.0219*** 0.000977 
Unemployment Rate 0.00400*** 0.00104 
HPI 0.0131*** 0.000043 
Real Median Household Income -0.00018*** 1.968E-6 
10-Year Treasury Rate 0.00504*** 0.00201 
Note: ***represent significant levels of 1% 
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4.1.4 The Model with Macroeconomic Variables and 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage 
Minus the Original Interest Rate 
 
The leading sellers of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage are Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan Chase, 
and Bank of America. The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage is often chosen because the 
scheduled monthly payment is fixed and less than that for 10-year mortgages, 15-year 
mortgages, and other fixed mortgages. Also, less monthly payment enables borrowers to 
obtain a more expensive mortgage. One way for borrowers to avoid defaulting is being 
willing to refinance. The net present value of mortgages is a rule for refinancing that is 
recognized by most scholars. Most borrowers prefer to refinance with a lower interest rate 
than a higher interest rate. However, researchers believe borrowers should refinance if 
differences in interest rates is higher. In the next model, I used the difference between 30-
year fixed-rate mortgage and original interest rate to measure the interest-rate volatility and 
to see if it is a useful proxy to study the default rate.  
Table 15 Validation Test of The Third Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Test Chi-Square Value P-value 
Likelihood 5570714.26 0.0001 
Score 5474008.69 0.0001 
Wald 4507338.90 0.0001 
 
The Likelihood test with Chi-Square Value of 5570714.26 and P-value of 0.0001, shows 
that the model is significant than an empty model. 
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The logistical model is estimated as follows: 
Log (default rate) = 5.59+ 0.0168 Debt-to-income-ratio +0.01103 LTV -0.0145 
borrowers’ credit score-0.0385 Real GDP+0.0781CPI+0.0648 Unemployment 
Rate+0.0168 HPI -0.00002 Real Median Household Income -0.3299 30-year fixed rate 
mortgage minus original interest rate  
 
For every unit increase in debt-to-income-ratio, the log odds of defaulting increases by 
0.0168; for every unit increase in LTV, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0. 01103; for 
every unit increase in borrowers’ credit score, the log odds of defaulting decreases by 
0.0145; for every percentage increase in real GDP, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0385; for every percentage increase in CPI, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.0781; 
for a unit increase in the unemployment rate, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.0648; 
for a unit increases in HPI, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.0168; for a unit increase 
in real median household income, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 0.00002; for a 
unit increases in the difference between 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and original interest 
rate, the log odds of defaulting decreases by 0.3299. 
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Table 16 Parameter of The Third Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 5.5936*** 0.0581 
Debt-to-income-ratio 0.0168*** 0.000037 
LTV 0.0103*** 0.000030 
Borrower’s credit score -0.0145*** 8.205E-6 
Real GDP -0.0385*** 0.000313 
CPI 0.0781*** 0.000799 
Unemployment Rate 0.0648*** 0.000811 
HPI 0.0168*** 0.000036 
Real Median Household Income -0.00002*** 9.127E-7 
The difference between 30-year 
fixed-rate mortgage and original 
interest rate 
-0.3299*** 0.000690 
Note: ***represent significant levels of 1% 
 
In the model, debt-to-income ratio, LTV, borrower’s credit score, real GDP, 
unemployment rate, HPI, and real median household income have the same relationship as 
in the previous models, while CPI changed from a negative correlation to a positive 
correlation to mortgage defaulting. The difference between 30-year fixed-rate mortgage 
and the original interest rate shows a negative association with default rate. The negative 
relationship shows that difference in interest rates can trigger borrowers to refinance and 
avoid default. The combination with CPI and the interest volatility can explain the change 
in CPI. Higher inflation causes equity prices increase and borrowers tend to borrow more 
to obtain the loan. However, once the inflation decreases, this positive equity becomes 
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negative equity, and it is difficult for borrowers to refinance in a poor economic situation, 
resulting in an increased default rate. 
 
4.1.5 The Model with Macroeconomic Variables by Period 
 
The subprime mortgage crisis occurred in 2007 and developed into a worldwide financial 
crisis and a global economic downturn. I divided the sample period into two periods: before 
the financial crisis and after the financial crisis. 
Phase 1: 2000 to 2006  
In March 2000, the burst of the stock market bubble occurred in NASDAQ, decreasing real 
GDP to the lowest level in 2001. To recover the economy, the Federal Reserve dramatically 
dropped the effective federal funds rate and kept it low until the year 2004. Economic 
recovery began in 2001 and increased until 2005. After the economy declined in 2001, the 
unemployment rate increased until 2003 and then began decreasing until 2006. In this 
period, the whole economy was in recovery, and many people borrowed mortgage loans in 
the period because of the low effective federal funds rate and relatively small 30-year fixed-
rate mortgages. 
In the correlation table, the real GDP and CPI significantly correlates, so I omitted CPI 
from the following models and kept other variables. 
 
The validation test shows that that the model is significant. 
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Table 17 Validation Test of The Fourth Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Test Chi-Square Value P-value 
Likelihood 1511188.54 0.0001 
Score 1516541.75 0.0001 
Wald 1304453.89 0.0001 
 
 
 
The logistical model is estimated as follows: 
Log (default rate) = 39.17+ 0.0096 Debt-to-income-ratio +0.0087 LTV -0.0136 
Borrowers’ credit score-0.0312 Real GDP-0.0473 Unemployment Rate+0.00933 HPI -
0.00053 Real Median Household Income -0.1214 30-year fixed rate mortgage minus 
original interest rate  
 
For every unit increase in debt-to-income-ratio, the log odds of defaulting increase by 
0.01096; For every unit increase in LTV, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0. 0087; 
For every unit increase in borrowers’ credit score, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0136; for every percentage increase in real GDP, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0312; for a unit increase in unemployment rate, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0473; for a unit increase in HPI, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.00933; for a 
unit increase in real median household income, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.00053; for a unit increase in the difference between 30-year fixed rate mortgage and 
original interest rate, the log odds of default decrease by 0.1214. 
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Table 18 Parameter of The Fourth Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 39.1726*** 0.3860 
Debt-to-income-ratio 0.00957*** 0.000060 
LTV 0.00867*** 0.000050 
Borrower’s credit score -0.0136*** 0.000013 
Real GDP -0.0312*** 0.00250 
Unemployment Rate -0.4773*** 0.00391 
HPI 0.00933*** 0.000099 
Real Median Household Income -0.00053*** 6.445E-6 
The difference between the 30-year 
fixed-rate mortgage and original 
interest rate 
-0.1214*** 0.00112 
Note: ***represent significant levels of 1% 
 
In the model of 2000 to 2006, the debt-to-income ratio, LTV, borrowers’ credit score, real 
GDP, HPI, and real median household income maintain the same relationship with default 
rate, while unemployment rate changes from a positive to a negative association with 
default rate. In this phase, the real median household income parameter increases from -
0.00002 to -0.00053, which shows that the real median household income has a more 
significant contribution to this model than previous models. The change in unemployment 
rate from the default relationship can be explained by the following reasons. 
First, the economy of the United States has grown from 1992 to 2006, and people had 
relatively high real median household income during this period. Although a decline 
happened in 2001, the economy soon recovered. Since people have relatively high real 
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median household income, they can spend more on monthly payments, and decrease the 
probability of defaulting. 
Second, although many people were laid off in this period, they received relatively high 
compensation, which supported them in paying loans on time.  
 
The model demonstrates that unemployment is a trigger event to defaulting. However, if 
an income can support a borrower in paying a loan, the borrower is more likely to avoid a 
default even in an unemployment situation. 
 
Phase 2: 2007 to 2012 
From 2002 to 2004, the Federal Reserve had lowered the effective federal funds rates and 
made mortgage loans more attractive to borrowers, especially in the subprime mortgage 
market, making mortgage loans available to people who previously could not pay. From 
2005, the Federal Reserve continued increasing the effective federal funds rates and 
sparked a subprime mortgage default crisis, which developed into a global financial crisis. 
During the period, the real GDP sharply dropped to the lowest level in 2008 and increased 
the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate peaked in 2010. The Federal Reserve kept 
the effective federal funds rate at a low level, approximately 0.1 to 0.2 from 2009 to 2012, 
to simulate the economy.  
In this model, I used the same variables as in the previous model, and the results show that 
the model is significant. 
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Table 19 Validation Test of The Fifth Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Test Chi-Square Value P-value 
Likelihood 4093395.17 0.0001 
Score 3954215.27 0.0001 
Wald 3170757.29 0.0001 
 
 
The logistical model is estimated as follows: 
Log (default rate) = 20.88+ 0.0206 Debt-to-income-ratio +0.0115 LTV -0.0150 
borrowers’ credit score-0.0957 Real GDP+0.2334 Unemployment Rate+0.1088 HPI -
0.00056 Real Median Household Income -0.4560 30-year fixed rate mortgage minus 
original interest rate  
For every unit increase in debt-to-income-ratio, the log odds of defaulting increase by 
0.0206; for every unit increase in LTV, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0. 0115; for 
every unit increase in borrowers’ credit score, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0150; for every percent increase in Real GDP, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 
0.0957; for a unit increase in unemployment rate, the log odds of defaulting increase by 
0.2334; for a unit increase in HPI, the log odds of defaulting increase by 0.1088; for a unit 
increase in real median household income, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 0.00056; 
for a unit increase in the difference between 30-year fixed rate mortgage and original 
interest rate, the log odds of defaulting decrease by 0.4560. 
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Table 20 Parameter of The Fifth Model with Macroeconomic Variables 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 20.8813*** 0.1285 
Debt-to-income-ratio 0.0206*** 0.000047 
LTV 0.0115*** 0.000038 
Borrower’s credit score -0.0150*** 0.000011 
Real GDP -0.0957*** 0.000799 
Unemployment Rate 0.2334*** 0.00197 
HPI 0.1088*** 0.000747 
Real Median Household Income -0.00056*** 4.484E-6 
The difference between the 30-year 
fixed-rate mortgage and original 
interest rate 
-0.4560*** 0.000901 
Note: ***represent significant levels of 1% 
 
In this model, the debt-to-income ratio, LTV, unemployment rate, and HPI positively relate 
to the default rate. Borrowers’ credit score, real GDP, real median household income, and 
the difference between average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and the original interest rate 
have a negative relationship with default rate. 
In this period, real GDP had a significant contribution to defaulting compared with the 
previous models. This is because the real GDP showed a considerable change in the period, 
and the change significantly affected the model’s result. The unemployment rate had a 
positive relationship with defaulting in this period. The real median household income 
decreased from 2007, and the severe financial recession made it more challenging to find 
jobs during this time. Without a reliable income, borrowers are more likely to default. 
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4.2 Results 
 
In the first model, I used five static variables to build the model and found that they indeed 
contribute to the default rate. In the second model, I combined the traditional model’s 
variables with macroeconomic variables. In the third model, I used the 10-year Treasury 
rate instead of the effective federal funds rate and left other variables unchanged. In the 
fourth model, I used the difference between the average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and 
the original interest rate instead of the 10-year Treasury rate and left other variables 
unchanged. Then, I divided the period into two periods to see the contribution of 
macroeconomic variables in different periods.  
The results show that all models are significantly better than an empty model, which means 
the findings of the entire paper are valid. By comparing the five models, I found that debt-
to-income ratio, LTV, and HPI have a positive relationship with the default rate. 
Borrowers’ credit score, real GDP, and real median household income have a negative 
correlation with the default rate. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Discussion 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
Debt-to-income ratio measures the proportion of debt to income. The larger the ratio, the 
higher the probability of defaulting. The LTV calculates the loan for a purchased asset. The 
higher the ratio, the higher the possibility of defaulting. The HPI is a measure of the house 
price. As a house price increases, borrowers are more likely to default, and vice versa. A 
borrower’s credit score reflects the trustworthiness of the borrower. The higher the 
borrower’s credit score, the lower the default rate.  
Real GDP has significant negative relationship with default rate. As the fifth model shows, 
one percentage change increase in real GDP, the default rate decrease by 0.1%. Real 
median household income seldom appeared in the previous work of scholars, but this paper 
shows that it is an excellent proxy to measure the default rate. When borrowers have a 
higher real median household income, they are more likely to keep a property even when 
they are facing unemployment situations. However, if the real median household income 
is low, and borrowers have no other income sources, then unemployment can be a 
significant event to trigger a default. The CPI is an indicator of inflation, and it works 
similarly to real GDP in most situations, but it is a proxy that must be combined with other 
variables to demonstrate its role in predicting the mortgage default rate. 
I also used three kinds of interest rates to measure their relationship with the default rate in 
a dynamic way. The first rate is the effective federal funds rate, and it is an excellent proxy 
to predicting defaults. The rate has a positive relationship with mortgage default. A low 
rate encourages people to consume and spend money. From 2002 to 2004, the rate was 
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low, and the number of mortgages was high, which shows that a flat rate encourages more 
people to buy houses. However, after the Federal Reserve increased the rate, house prices 
and monthly payments increased, and borrowers defaulted due to having no money for 
monthly payments. The 10-year Treasury rate also has a negative relationship with default 
rate. The difference between 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and the original interest rate has 
a negative relationship with the default rate. The negative relationship shows that interest 
rate volatility is a useful proxy to predict default rate and it is also a useful policy tool for 
controlling mortgage performance. 
Based on these models, I found that real GDP, HPI, real median household income, and 
the effective federal funds rate are good proxies in predicting the mortgage default rate. 
Although the estimated parameter of real median household income is small compared with 
the other three variables, the real median household income always has a negative 
relationship with the default rate. Moreover, the real median household income also has a 
high correlation with interest rate, so I believe it is an essential proxy among other 
macroeconomic variables in predicting the default rate. 
5.2 Further Research 
 
5.2.1 Because Fannie Mae records the location of mortgage borrowers in the performance 
dataset, I should gather 20 city HPIs to explore the default rate of the leading 20 cities 
and the relationship between the macroeconomies of these 20 cities in the future.  
5.2.2 In the paper, I used only three variables from the performance data, but I hope to 
use more variables under a reasonable limited storage environment.  
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5.2.3 In the models discussed in this paper, I used only the logistic regression model to 
predict the default rate, but there are many other methodologies that can be used to 
predict the default rate, and I should use diverse methods to study this rate. 
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